

Appendix 1: Cleveland Fire Authority Corporate Risk Register			Original Risk (Before Mitigation)			Current Risk (After Mitigation)						
Description of Risk	Date Added to Register	Date of Last Review	Original Impact	Original Likelihood	Original Risk Score	Current Impact	Current Likelihood	Current Risk Score	Direction of Travel	Risk Narrative (reason for inclusion and risk history)	Control Measures	Register Status
<p><b>IF</b> there is a failure to effectively <b>recruit, train and retain on-call Firefighters</b> <b>THEN</b> this will affect appliance availability, negatively impacting on community safety.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	5	4	20	5	4	20	No Change	<p>CFB, as witnessed nationally across the Fire Sector, have seen a steady decline in on-call appliance availability. This is a result of recruitment and retention struggles, with availability levels of On-Call appliances being a continuing concern. An Action has been added to the CFB Service Plan for 2025/26 - <i>Review and implement the On Call Improvement Programme to increase the Availability of On-Call Fire Appliances</i></p>	<p>After the 2024 Pay award, pay bandings were introduced nationally. CFB implemented incremental bandings to ensure a fairer and more incentivised pay structure for on call staff. Recruitment was paused for the period of banding contract implementation.</p> <p>In June 2025, a Local Agreement was signed with the FBU to approve these bandings.</p> <p>New contracts are being issued in August 2025, and the On-Call Working Group will then be re-established to re-launch recruitment campaigns tailored to each individual station, and to progress the On-Call Improvement Plan based around recruitment, retention and training.</p>	Continuing Risk
<p><b>IF</b> there is a <b>loss of certain skillsets relating to single points of failure</b> <b>THEN</b> there may be service disruption and/or inability to discharge our full duties effectively.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	4	4	16	4	4	16	No Change	<p>Business continuity within the Fire Service relies upon a variety of skillsets ranging from operational through to corporate knowledge. When essential knowledge, access and decision making is concentrated on one individual or a small team this creates single points of failure that can severely disrupt day to day business and in CFB's case impact both corporately and operationally. CFB in comparison to other FRS' is small thereby heightening the risk of single points of failure. Key risks include: Financial, Operational delays, Loss of business continuity, Organisational Resilience, Legacy knowledge, Impact on staff morale/ culture. In addition, lack of investment in training (particularly corporate) has led to single points of failure.</p>	<p>Review full service to identify the single points of failure.</p> <p>Critical processes/ functions and decisions need to be documented</p> <p>Cross training for staff to ensure multiple staff can perform key functions</p> <p>Ensure succession planning identifies and develops future leaders and specialists</p> <p>Use shared platforms and access controls to create system redundancy</p> <p>Perform regular risk reviews and audit corporate functions for single points of failure</p> <p>Exercise and test points of failure with business continuity events</p> <p>Upskill staff (cross level training)</p>	Continuing Risk
<p><b>IF</b> the Brigade's <b>current in house Community Safety System</b> experiences reduced functionality and capability <b>THEN</b> inaccurate data about the quantity and quality of Safer Homes Visits may be reported and the targeting methodology to reduce community risk may not be supported.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	4	4	16	4	4	16	No Change	<p>The Brigade currently relies on an in-house developed Community Safety System to record, monitor, and analyse data relating to Safer Homes Visits. This system underpins the strategic targeting of community safety interventions and supports evidence-based decision-making aimed at reducing fire risk across the community.</p> <p>Due to the age of the system, it cannot be upgraded or developed further and it is becoming difficult to maintain. Limited functionality has been experienced resulting in some data either being duplicated or missing from the system altogether. This is a risk to the organisation as it is our log of the properties/people we have visited and could result in us not being aware of the status of vulnerable people.</p>	<p>Community Safety System working group established that formulated short, medium and long term goals.</p> <p>We are currently procuring a new CSS that will resolve issues identified from current system and mitigate the risk completely.</p> <p>Continue quality assurance and data cleansing of the existing system to ensure quality data.</p>	Continuing Risk

<p><b>IF</b> there is insufficient <b>capacity and/or skills to deliver the Risk Based Inspection Programme</b> under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 <b>THEN</b> we may not effectively enforce the provisions of the Fire Safety Order and the requirements of the Building Safety Bill.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	4	4	16	4	4	16	No Change	<p>The capacity and skills of the Protection department have been affected by both the retention of staff and the inability to recruit suitably qualified staff. When there is insufficient capacity or skills to deliver the Risk Based Inspection Programme under the Fire Safety Order 2005, we may fail to enforce fire safety legislation effectively. This could result in non-compliance among duty holders and increased risk in high-hazard premises. It may also hinder alignment with the Building Safety Bill, affecting regulatory credibility.</p> <p>To ensure the continued effectiveness of our Risk-Based Inspection Programme (RBIP), we are committed to embedding and regularly evaluating its methodology to maintain a clear focus on premises presenting the highest levels of risk. A departmental and RBIP review is underway to ensure our activities remain within operational capacity and are appropriately prioritised</p> <p>Another key priority is the improvement or replacement of the current CFRMIS system, with development work scheduled to commence following the implementation of the new CSS. Initial scoping has already taken place, including engagement with external organisations and systems to inform future options for a modernised protection platform. Staff development remains central to our strategy. We continue to align training with the National Competency Framework for Fire Safety Regulators, ensuring our personnel maintain the necessary skills and knowledge</p>	Continuing Risk
<p><b>IF</b> Cleveland Fire Brigade Risk Management Service <b>CIC</b> do not operate in a way which aligns with the Brigade's values <b>THEN</b> there is a risk of financial and reputational impact.</p>	Feb-25	Oct-25	4	4	16	2	1	2	Cooling Down	<p>Following revision of the Service Level Agreement in April 2025, CFBRMS, gave notice in June 2025 to CFB to vacate Billingham Fire Station and to terminate the SLA. In June 2025, CFB and the CFA were made aware, through social media, of an insolvency petition, filed by HMRC scheduled for 13th August 2025 in the High Court, (unpaid debts of approximately £650k to HMRC). The MD of CFBRMS has been unavailable to contact, however subsequent meetings with the Chair of the Board and PRF (liquidator firm, advising CFBRMS), identified significant debts over and above the amount owed to HMRC.</p> <p>CFBRMS went into liquidation on 31st July 2025.</p> <p>Although there has been some negative media coverage, this has predominantly focused on two officers, who currently work for CFB.</p> <p>Weekly briefings between the CFO and Chair of CFA</p> <p>Briefing to CFA on 27th June 2025</p> <p>Meeting between CFO, Chair, Vice Chair, Treasurer, Chair of CBRMS and PRF on 8th July 2025 to understand the financial situation and forthcoming plans by PRF</p> <p>Extraordinary meeting of CFA held on 1st August 2025 to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Approve the recommendation of the CIC Board to place the company into liquidation</li> <li>•Authorise the Chair of CFA to sign such documentation to facilitate actions required</li> <li>•Approve the write off of approximately £66,000 and fund the amount from investment income, which exceeds the budget forecast for the current year</li> </ul>	Continuing Risk
<p><b>IF</b> there is a <b>National Security/Terrorism</b> incident <b>THEN</b> our operational resources may be required to support national resilience, impacting on our ability to deliver business as usual.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	5	3	15	5	3	15	No Change	<p>A national security or terrorism incident—such as a large-scale attack, credible threat, or coordinated disruption could place extraordinary demands on CFB. These events often trigger a national resilience response, requiring fire services to shift focus from routine operations to supporting wider civil protection efforts. If CFB's resources were required, no doubt there would be a impact on BAU in terms of resource reallocation. Increased BAU demand and suspension of non-essential activities would need to be considered. There may be a strain on corporate functions whose teams may be required to support 24/7 operations and interoperability and command commitments may require senior officers to be embedded in multi-agency coordination centres (e.g. Strategic Coordinating Groups), impacting on their capacity. There will be heightened public and political scrutiny due to high-profile incidents attracting intense media and political attention, requiring additional communications, reporting, and assurance work that diverts focus from normal service delivery. There also may be fatigue and welfare risks, impacting morale, decision-making, and long-term resilience.</p> <p>Review and maintain robust Business Continuity Plans and mutual aid agreements</p> <p>Maintain NILO networks with Cleveland Police to prepare for national and local threats</p> <p>Ensure cross training and resilience is performed within corporate functions</p> <p>Regularly test major incident protocols and inter-agency coordination</p> <p>Invest in staff welfare, communications, and surge capacity planning</p>	Continuing Risk

<p><b>IF financial pressures</b> continue due to the insufficient funding settlement or additional financial pressures <b>THEN</b> our ability to deliver critical services may be compromised.</p>	Feb-25	Oct-25	5	3	15	5	5	25	Warming Up	<p>The Spending Review statement and the Fair Funding Review 2 proposals, both published June 2025 indicate a significant adverse financial impact on the Authority. Equalisation and transitional arrangements may lessen the impact but not remove it. There is a reliance on the Authority's reserves to balance the budget over the short term.</p>	<p>2026/27 Capital Programme identified, borrowing implications being considered as part of the budget setting process Nov/Dec 2025</p> <p>Align productivity to budget spend.</p> <p>26/27 Review Medium Term Financial Strategy including efficiencies and reserves.</p> <p>Regularly review the CFB Information Security Policy</p>	Continuing Risk
<p><b>IF</b> there is a <b>cyber attack</b> <b>THEN</b> there may be significant disruption impacting on our ability to fulfil our statutory functions.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	4	3	12	4	3	12	No Change	<p>As organisations become ever more dependant on technology and digital services, there are ever increasing technology risks from cyber attacks. Such attacks are attempted constantly, with the intention to either cause disruption or for financial gain.</p> <p>Cyber security risks for fire and rescue services include operational disruption from attacks on critical mobilisation, communication and call-handling systems, which can ultimately affect the ability to fulfill statutory functions.</p> <p>Other risks involve equipment malfunction from compromised control systems, data breaches of sensitive information and service-wide failures caused by ransomware or other malware. These vulnerabilities can stem from internal and external threats, technology risks, and third-party dependencies.</p>	<p>Regularly review and test the Digital Data &amp; Technology Business Continuity Plan</p> <p>Ensure cyber security defences (firewalls, anti-virus, access controls, device management) are up to date at all times</p> <p>Address improvement actions identified within the NFCC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)</p> <p>Work towards full compliance with the NFCC Digital &amp; Cyber Fire Standard</p> <p>Independent IT Health Check of CFB systems undertaken in September 2025 and remedial actions completed</p> <p>Participate in lessons learnt reviews on cyber security issues within Fire and Rescue</p>	Continuing Risk
<p><b>IF Industrial Action</b> occurs <b>THEN</b> the Brigade may be unable to fulfil its statutory functions.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	5	2	10	5	2	10	No Change	<p>In 2023, the FBU balloted for industrial action. CFB performed business continuity planning to meet its statutory duties under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004.</p> <p>Although a number of resilience staff (including drivers were recruited) the planning arrangements highlighted there would be a shortage of commanders and other staff to perform the essential roles to meet our statutory emergency response requirements. A Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) request was submitted in December 2022, to support front line response. Although the pay dispute was settled and the strike action never occurred, it highlighted a lack of resilience for future industrial action.</p> <p>The Minimum Service Levels Act 2023 was introduced in 2023, and repealed in 2024.</p>	<p>The Fire and Rescue National Framework states that Fire Authorities should not base their contingency plans on the assumption that military support will not be available.</p> <p>Business Continuity Plans will be updated to reflect the new organisational structure</p> <p>Business Continuity exercises will be planned taking into account staff roles and responsibilities and consider other opportunities.</p> <p>Conduct and refine scenario modelling and planning for the most appropriate disposition of resources for different levels of available resources.</p> <p>Evaluate the likely level of available personnel.</p> <p>Review Business Continuity communication strategy</p> <p>Investigate options for alternative methods to mobilise fire appliances.</p> <p>Recruit and train resilience staff</p> <p>Impact assess all service areas – public facing</p>	Continuing Risk

<p>IF we suffer reputational damage from any source THEN there may be a <b>loss of public confidence</b> in our service. This risk could adversely affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the Authority/Brigade.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	3	3	9	3	3	9	No Change	<p>A fire and rescue service relies heavily on public trust and confidence to operate effectively. If the service suffers reputational damage—whether due to operational failings, leadership issues, misconduct, or negative media coverage—it can trigger a loss of public confidence. This erosion of trust can have wide-ranging consequences for both the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. Reputational damage can lead to service impact, such as reduced community engagement and lower staff morale and retention. Increased scrutiny and oversight can take place e.g audits or regulatory intervention diverting leadership attention and resources from core service delivery. Operational disruption can be impacted by public complaints or protests may increase, and cooperation during incidents may be hindered if trust in the service is compromised. Reputational issues can influence political and financial support potentially affecting budgets and investment and long-term projects, partnerships, or transformation programmes may stall if stakeholders lose confidence in the service's leadership or direction.</p> <p>Proactive reputation management needs to take place through a clear comms strategy, whilst monitoring the media and public sentiments and regular community engagement. Crisis communication plans need to be rehearsed, with a rapid response capability to address misinformation and negative coverage. Visible, accountable leadership is key, particularly during challenging times to promote a culture of professionalism, inclusivity and ethical behaviour and foster trust. Mistakes need to be acknowledged and lessons learnt reports published, with strong stakeholder engagement.</p>	Continuing Risk
<p>IF there are changes to our community risk profile and area economic profile leading to <b>increased vulnerability</b> THEN this may increase demands for, and expectations of, the delivery of our services.</p>	Feb-25	Nov-25	3	2	6	3	2	6	No Change	<p>Rising deprivation, unemployment, housing, or other vulnerability factors, may lead to increased demand for Cleveland Fire Brigade's services. Vulnerable communities often face higher fire risk and may require more targeted prevention, protection, and response activity. Additionally, public expectations of service delivery may rise, placing pressure on resources and operational capacity. Without appropriate planning and adaptability, this could impact service effectiveness and strategic priorities.</p> <p>Work with partners to deliver Safer Homes Visits targeted at those most vulnerable. Continue our programme of quality assurance and evaluation of Safer Homes Visits to ensure visits have a positive impact.</p>	Continuing Risk
<p>IF implementation of the <b>new Community Safety System</b> is not successful THEN there may be an impact on staff confidence and continuing risks associated with the current system.</p>	Feb-25	Nov-25	2	3	6	2	3	6	No Change	<p>Significant organisational time and financial resources have been invested in the procurement and development of a new Community Safety System, in collaboration with an external provider. Phase 1 of the project was scheduled for delivery in August 2025, however, as of November 2025, this milestone has not been met. The system delivered to date has presented several issues, requiring more extensive input and support from the DDaT team than originally anticipated. These delays and complications have the potential to affect staff confidence in the project and prolong reliance on the existing system, which carries known operational risks.</p> <p>To mitigate this risk, clear communication, robust training, and phased implementation with user feedback are essential. Pilot stations have been identified and a number of issues reported from them have been given to the provider to work through. The majority of these have been resolved so a period of further testing of it has begun.</p>	Continuing Risk
<p>IF incidents relating to <b>wildfire and flooding</b> increase THEN we may need to take a different approach to resourcing to risk.</p>	Feb-25	Aug-25	3	2	6	3	2	6	No Change	<p>With climate change and environmental shifts, Fire and Rescue Services are increasingly facing more frequent and severe incidents involving wildfires and flooding. These types of incidents differ significantly from traditional urban fire risks and require a strategic shift in how resources are allocated and deployed. Demand on resources increase, due to a larger geographic spread arising from floods and wildfires, requiring increased resources and equipment, alongside dealing with BAU demand. Specialist capabilities including equipment, PPE and skillsets will be required, whilst close coordination with other agencies is key. Seasonal and geographic variability also affects demand and requires dynamic resource</p> <p>Consider risk based resource allocation Review specialist capabilities including wildfire (current Wildfire Strategy runs from 2023-2027) and flooding Invest in specialist training for staff and consider regional/ national surge capacity training Work with local communities, local authorities and other agencies to reduce wildfire risk Collaborate with LRFs and emergency planning teams to ensure a coordinated</p>	Continuing Risk

IF there is an <b>event that compromises Firefighter safety</b> <b>THEN</b> this may result in death or serious injury.	Feb-25	Aug-25	5	1	5	5	1	5	No Change	The safety of firefighters is of paramount importance and remains a core operational priority. It is acknowledged, however, that personnel may be required to enter environments classified as hazardous in the course of their duties. Despite the presence of a highly trained workforce and robust control measures, the potential for serious injury or death persists. Such an incident would not only have profound human consequences but could also result in significant reputational impact for the organisation, both internally and externally, and place additional operational and emotional demands on staff involved in the response and recovery phases.	CFB have an extensive range of Health and Safety procedures and controls as well as effective training and a strong safety culture to ensure the safety of staff attending operational incidents.	Continuing Risk
IF changes resulting from the Government <b>Devolution White Paper</b> impact local government support services <b>THEN</b> there may be an impact on the FRS enabling services delivered in collaboration with local authorities.	Mar-25	Aug-25	2	3	6	2	3	6	No Change	The Government's Devolution White Paper may lead to changes in local government structures, responsibilities, or funding arrangements. Such changes have the potential to disrupt the collaborative delivery of support services between Cleveland Fire Brigade and local authorities. Enabling services, such as finance, HR, and DDaT could be affected, potentially leading to increased operational pressure and challenges in maintaining service continuity. Furthermore, any lack of clarity or consistency in local governance could hinder planning and partnership working, impacting our ability to deliver effective and integrated public services.	Maintaining communications with MPs, regional and local government.	Continuing Risk
If the ongoing issue with the <b>Multi-Agency Coordination System</b> is not resolved, then the risk to CFB will be loss of communication between the Control room and the incident ground, and the risk of missing a 999 emergency call.	Aug-25	Aug-25	5	5	25	5	5	25	No Change	A part the issue relates to the incoming 999 line, on occasion the member of the public calling the 999 lines cannot hear the Control operator. If this continues to be an issue, then there is the potential a 999 call may be missed and CFB fail to mobilise to an emergency situation	DDAT are working alongside Motorola to address issue and find permanent fix. Hand held radios can be used as a back up to maintain contact with crews.	Continuing Risk
IF we continue to operate with limited internal <b>pensions</b> knowledge, expertise, and capacity, <b>THEN</b> there is a risk of non-compliance with pension regulations, which could result in regulatory penalties from The Pensions Regulator, the initiation of Internal Dispute Resolution Procedures (IDRPs), and potential legal action from affected members.	Oct-25	Oct-25	3	3	9	3	3	9	New Risk	Complexities remain within the Firefighters' Pension Scheme following recent legislative changes, with further amendments anticipated. The organisation is heavily reliant on a small number of staff who possess working knowledge of the scheme, though pensions are not their area of specialism and this work is undertaken alongside their primary roles. This presents a vulnerability in the organisation's ability to manage pensions effectively and respond confidently to regulatory developments	Close collaboration with XPS and TWPF, who administer the pension schemes on behalf of the organisation, to obtain technical advice and guidance. Additional support is sought from LGA Pensions Advisors. Members of the HR team have received training to improve their understanding of pension matters; however, this remains at a foundational level.	New Risk