

Cleveland Fire Authority Corporate Risk Register				Original Risk (Before Mitigation)		Current Risk (After Mitigation)							
Risk ID	Description of Risk	Date Added to Register	Date of Last Review	Original Impact	Original Likelihood	Original Risk Score	Current Impact	Current Likelihood	Current Risk Score	Direction of Travel	Risk Narrative (reason for inclusion and risk history)	Control Measures	Register Status
CRR2	IF there is a failure to effectively recruit, train and retain on-call Firefighters THEN this will affect appliance availability, negatively impacting on community safety.	Feb-25	Aug-26	5	4	20	5	4	20	No Change	CFB, as witnessed nationally across the Fire Sector, have seen a steady decline in on-call appliance availability. This is a result of recruitment and retention struggles, with availability levels of On-Call appliances being a continuing concern. An Action has been added to the CFB Service Plan for 2025/26 - <i>Review and implement the On Call Improvement Programme to increase the Availability of On-Call Fire Appliances</i>	After the 2024 Pay award, pay bandings were introduced nationally. CFB implemented incremental bandings to ensure a fairer and more invcenttised pay structure for on call staff. Recruitment was paused for the period of banding contract implementation. In June 2025, a Local Agreement was signed with the FBU to approve these bandings. New contracts are being issued in August 2025, and the On-Call Working Group will then be re-established to re-launch recruitment campaigns tailored to each individual station, and to progress the On-Call Improvement Plan based around recruitment, retention and training.	Continuing Risk
CRR3	IF there is a loss of certain skillsets relating to single points of failure THEN there may be service disruption and/or inability to discharge our full duties effectively.	Feb-25	Apr-26	4	4	16	4	4	16	No Change	Business continuity within the Fire Service relies upon a variety of skillsets ranging from operational through to coporate knowledge. When essential knowledge, access and decision making is concentrated on one individual or a small team this creates single points of failure that can severely disrupt day to day business and in CFB's case impact both corporately and operationally. CFB in comparison to other FRS' is small thereby heightening the risk of single points of failure. Key risks include: Financial, Operational delays, Loss of business continuity, Organisational Resilience, Legacy knowledge, Impact on staff morale/ culture. In addition, lack of investment in training (particulatry corporate) has led to single points of failure.	Review full service to identify the single points of failure. Critical processes/ functions and decisions need to be documented Cross training for staff to ensure multiple staff can perform key functions Ensure succession planning indentifies and develops future leaders and specialists Use shared platforms and access controls to create system redundancy Perform regular risk reviews and audit coporate functions for single points of failure Exercise and test points of failure with business continuity events Upskill staff (cross level training)	Continuing Risk
CRR5	IF there is insufficient capacity and/or skills to deliver the Risk Based Inspection Programme under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 THEN we may not effectively enforce the provisions of the Fire Safety Order and the requirements of the Building Safety Bill.	Feb-25	Aug-26	4	4	16	4	2	8	Cooling Down	The capacity and skills of the Protection department have been affected by both the retention of staff and the inability to recruit suitably qualified staff. When there is insufficient capacity or skills to deliver the Risk Based Inspection Programme under the Fire Safety Order 2005, we may fail to enforce fire safety legislation effectively. This could result in non-compliance among duty holders and increased risk in high-hazard premises. It may also hinder alignment with the Building Safety Bill, affecting regulatory credibility.	To ensure the continued effectiveness of our Risk-Based Inspection Programme (RBIP), we are committed to embedding and regularly evaluating its methodology to maintain a clear focus on premises presenting the highest levels of risk. A departmental and RBIP review is underway to ensure our activities remain within operational capacity and are appropriately prioritised Another key priority is the improvement or replacement of the current CFRMIS system, with development work scheduled to commence following the implementation of the new CSS. Initial scoping has already taken place, including engagement with external organisations and systems to inform future options for a modernised protection platform. Staff development remains central to our strategy. We continue to align training with the National Competency Framework for Fire Safety Regulators, ensuring our personnel maintain the necessary skills and knowledge to deliver the RBIP. Our inspection efforts have been concentrated on premises identified as Very High, High, and Higher Medium risk, with all such locations either inspected or visited. Where access has not been possible, we have utilised Land Registry data and other sources to proactively engage with responsible persons. Mitigation strategies will continue to focus on workforce planning, competency development, and the prioritisation of inspections to	Continuing Risk

CRR7	IF there is a National Security/Terrorism incident THEN our operational resources may be required to support national resilience, impacting on our ability to deliver business as usual.	Feb-25	Apr-26	5	3	15	5	3	15	No Change	A national security or terrorism incident—such as a large-scale attack, credible threat, or coordinated disruption could place extraordinary demands on CFB. These events often trigger a national resilience response, requiring fire services to shift focus from routine operations to supporting wider civil protection efforts. If CFB's resources were required, no doubt there would be a impact on BAU in terms of resource reallocation. Increased BAU demand and suspension of non-essential activities would need to be considered. There may be a strain on corporate functions whose teams may be required to support 24/7 operations and interoperability and command commitments may require senior officers to be embedded in multi-agency coordination centres (e.g. Strategic Coordinating Groups), impacting on their capacity. There will be heightened public and political scrutiny due to high-profile incidents attracting intense media and political attention, requiring additional communications, reporting, and assurance work that diverts focus from normal service delivery. There also may be fatigue and welfare risks, impacting morale, decision-making, and long-term resilience.	Review and maintain robust Business Continuity Plans and mutual aid agreements Maintain NILO networks with Cleveland Police to prepare for national and local threats Ensure cross training and resilience is performed within corporate functions Regularly test major incident protocols and inter-agency coordination Invest in staff welfare, communications, and surge capacity planning	Continuing Risk
CRR8	IF financial pressures continue due to the insufficient funding settlement or additional financial pressures THEN our ability to deliver critical services may be compromised.	Feb-25	Aug-26	5	3	15	5	5	25	Warming Up	The three year Local Government Finance Settlement (2026/27 to 2028/29) will have an adverse financial impact on the Authority. Additionally, the USA/Iran war will increase inflation above the levels forecast by the Bank of England and provided for within out Medium Term Financial Strategy. There is a reliance on the Authority's reserves to balance the budget over the short term.	A three year Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) is prepared which integrates the revenue budget requirement, capital spending requirements and our reserves strategy. On the basis of the existing MTFS, the Chief Fire Officer is required to present a details of proposed cuts to address the existing forecast deficit of £1.197m to the Authority in July. A review of the MTFS will also be completed and reported later in the year to determine if additional budget cuts may be necessary over the next 2 to 3 years. Undertake pay award modelling to identify likely budgetary pressure from the 26/27 and future years pay negotiations and formal offer from NJC. Aim to reduce our electricity, gas, and water consumption year on year. Use the outcomes from our Independent Resource Review to develop options for improving our emergency response cover to meet current and future risks and demands.	Continuing Risk
CRR9	IF there is a cyber attack THEN there may be significant disruption impacting on our ability to fulfil our statutory functions.	Feb-25	Jul-26	4	3	12	5	4	20	Warming Up	As organisations become ever more dependant on technology and digital services, there are ever increasing technology risks from cyber attacks. Such attacks are attempted constantly, with the intention to either cause disruption or for financial gain. Cyber security risks for fire and rescue services include operational disruption from attacks on critical mobilisation, communication and call-handling systems, which can ultimately affect the ability to fulfill statutory functions. Other risks involve equipment malfunction from compromised control systems, data breaches of sensitive information and service-wide failures caused by ransomware or other malware. These vulnerabilities can stem from internal and external threats, technology risks, and third-party dependencies. Cyber Technical Advisory Group has confirmed the cyber risk to the UK public sector is currently Critically High.	Regularly review the CFB Information Security Policy Regularly review and test the Digital Data & Technology Business Continuity Plan Ensure cyber security defences (firewalls, anti-virus, access controls, device management) are up to date at all times Address improvement actions identified within the NFCC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Work towards full compliance with the NFCC Digital & Cyber Fire Standard Independent IT Health Check of CFB systems undertaken in September 2025 and remedial actions completed Participate in lessons learnt reviews on cyber security issues within Fire and Rescue Services Ensure all staff have undertaken cyber security e-learning	Continuing Risk

CRR10	IF Industrial Action occurs THEN the Brigade may be unable to fulfil its statutory functions.	Feb-25	Apr-26	5	2	10	5	2	10	No Change	In 2023, the FBU balloted for industrial action. CFB performed business continuity planning to meet its statutory duties under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. Although a number of resilience staff (including drivers were recruited) the planning arrangements highlighted there would be a shortage of commanders and other staff to perform the essential roles to meet our statutory emergency response requirements. A Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) request was submitted in December 2022, to support front line response. Although the pay dispute was settled and the strike action never occurred, it highlighted a lack of resilience for future industrial action. The Minimum Service Levels Act 2023 was introduced in 2023, and repealed in 2024.	The Fire and Rescue National Framework states that Fire Authorities should not base their contingency plans on the assumption that military support will not be available. Business Continuity Plans will be updated to reflect the new organisational structure Business Continuity exercises will be planned taking into account staff roles and responsibilities and consider other opportunities. Conduct and refine scenario modelling and planning for the most appropriate disposition of resources for different levels of available resources. Evaluate the likely level of available personnel. Review Business Continuity communication strategy Investigate options for alternative methods to mobilise fire appliances. Recruit and train resilience staff Impact assess all service areas – public facing and enabling services Consult and inform industrial partners re the impact of potential industrial action. Investigate and implement other sources of potential staffing resource cover all areas of service.	Continuing Risk
CRR11	IF we suffer reputational damage from any source THEN there may be a loss of public confidence in our service. This risk could adversely affect the effectiveness and efficiency of the Authority/Brigade.	Feb-25	Apr-26	3	3	9	4	4	16	Warming Up	A fire and rescue service relies heavily on public trust and confidence to operate effectively. If the service suffers reputational damage—whether due to operational failings, leadership issues, misconduct, or negative media coverage—it can trigger a loss of public confidence. This erosion of trust can have wide-ranging consequences for both the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. Reputational damage can lead to service impact, such as reduced community engagement and lower staff morale and retention. Increased scrutiny and oversight can take place e.g. audits or regulatory intervention diverting leadership attention and resources from core service delivery. Operational disruption can be impacted by public complaints or protests may increase, and cooperation during incidents may be hindered if trust in the service is compromised. Reputational issues can influence political and financial support potentially affecting budgets and investment and long-term projects, partnerships, or transformation programmes may stall if stakeholders lose confidence in the service's leadership or direction.	Proactive reputation management needs to take place through a clear comms strategy, whilst monitoring the media and public sentiments and regular community engagement. Crisis communication plans need to be rehearsed, with a rapid response capability to address misinformation and negative coverage. Visible, accountable leadership is key, particularly during challenging times to promote a culture of professionalism, inclusivity and ethical behaviour and foster trust. Mistakes need to be acknowledged and lessons learnt reports published, with strong stakeholder engagement. Media Training arranged for 13/4/26 with a focus on culture coverage.	Continuing Risk
CRR12	IF there are changes to our community risk profile and area economic profile leading to increased vulnerability THEN this may increase demands for, and expectations of, the delivery of our services.	Feb-25	Apr-26	3	2	6	3	2	6	No Change	Rising deprivation, unemployment, housing, or other vulnerability factors, may lead to increased demand for Cleveland Fire Brigade's services. Vulnerable communities often face higher fire risk and may require more targeted prevention, protection, and response activity. Additionally, public expectations of service delivery may rise, placing pressure on resources and operational capacity. Without appropriate planning and adaptability, this could impact service effectiveness and strategic priorities.	Work with partners to deliver Safer Homes Visits targetted at those most vulnerable. Continue our programme of quality assurance and evaluation of Safer Homes Visits to ensure visits have a positive impact.	Continuing Risk
CRR13	IF implementation of the new Community Safety System is not successful THEN there may be an impact on staff confidence and continuing risks associated with the current system.	Feb-25	Aug-26	2	3	6	2	3	6	No Change	Significant organisational time and financial resources have been invested in the procurement and development of a new Community Safety System, in collaboration with an external provider. Phase 1 of the project was scheduled for delivery in August 2025, however, as of November 2025, this milestone has not been met. The system delivered to date has presented several issues, requiring more extensive input and support from the DD&T team than originally anticipated. These delays and complications have the potential to affect staff confidence in the project and prolong reliance on the existing system, which carries known operational risks.	To mitigate this risk, clear communication, robust training, and phased implementation with user feedback are essential. Pilot stations have been identified and a number of issues reported from them have been given to the provider to work through. The majority of these have been resolved so a period of further testing of it has begun.	Continuing Risk

CRR14	IF incidents relating to wildfire and flooding increase THEN we may need to take a different approach to resourcing to risk.	Feb-25	Apr-26	3	2	6	3	2	6	No Change	With climate change and environmental shifts, Fire and Rescue Services are increasingly facing more frequent and severe incidents involving wildfires and flooding. These types of incidents differ significantly from traditional urban fire risks and require a strategic shift in how resources are allocated and deployed. Demand on resources increase, due to a larger geographic spread arising from floods and wildfires, requiring increased resources and equipment, alongside dealing with BAU demand. Specialist capabilities including equipment, PPE and skillsets will be required, whilst close coordination with other agencies is key. Seasonal and geographic variability also affects demand and requires dynamic resource	Consider risk based resource allocation Review specialist capabilities including wildfire (current Wildfire Strategy runs from 2023-2027) and flooding Invest in specialist training for staff and consider regional/ national surge capacity training Work with local communities, local authorities and other agencies to reduce wildfire risk Collaborate with LRFs and emergency planning teams to ensure a coordinated response and recovery	Continuing Risk
CRR15	IF there is an event that compromises Firefighter safety THEN this may result in death or serious injury.	Feb-25	Apr-26	5	1	5	5	1	5	No Change	The safety of firefighters is of paramount importance and remains a core operational priority. It is acknowledged, however, that personnel may be required to enter environments classified as hazardous in the course of their duties. Despite the presence of a highly trained workforce and robust control measures, the potential for serious injury or death persists. Such an incident would not only have profound human consequences but could also result in significant reputational impact for the organisation, both internally and externally, and place additional operational and emotional demands on staff involved in the response and recovery phases.	CFB have an extensive range of Health and Safety procedures and controls as well as effective training and a strong safety culture to ensure the safety of staff attending operational incidents.	Continuing Risk
CRR16	IF changes resulting from the Government Devolution White Paper impact local government support services THEN there may be an impact on the FRS enabling services delivered in collaboration with local authorities.	Mar-25	Apr-26	2	3	6	2	3	6	No Change	The Government's Devolution White Paper may lead to changes in local government structures, responsibilities, or funding arrangements. Such changes have the potential to disrupt the collaborative delivery of support services between Cleveland Fire Brigade and local authorities. Enabling services, such as finance, HR, and DDaT could be affected, potentially leading to increased operational pressure and challenges in maintaining service continuity. Furthermore, any lack of clarity or consistency in local governance could hinder planning and partnership working, impacting our ability to deliver effective and integrated public services.	Maintaining communications with MPs, regional and local government.	Continuing Risk
CRR18	IF we continue to operate with limited internal pensions knowledge, expertise, and capacity, THEN there is a risk of non-compliance with pension regulations, which could result in regulatory penalties from The Pensions Regulator, the initiation of Internal Dispute Resolution Procedures (IDRPs), and potential legal action from affected members.	Oct-25	Apr-26	3	3	9	3	3	9	No Change	Complexities remain within the Firefighters' Pension Scheme following recent legislative changes, with further amendments anticipated. The organisation is heavily reliant on a small number of staff who possess working knowledge of the scheme, though pensions are not their area of specialism and this work is undertaken alongside their primary roles. This presents a vulnerability in the organisation's ability to manage pensions effectively and respond confidently to regulatory developments	Close collaboration with XPS and TWPF, who administer the pension schemes on behalf of the organisation, to obtain technical advice and guidance. Additional support is sought from LGA Pensions Advisors. Members of the HR team have received training to improve their understanding of pension matters; however, this remains at a foundational level.	Continuing Risk
CRR19	IF physical security measures are not consistently applied THEN unauthorised access, theft, vandalism, or compromise of critical equipment and information may occur, reducing operational readiness and potentially impacting the safety of staff and the public.	Apr-26	Jul-26	2	4	8	2	4	8	No Change	Physical security relies on staff consistently applying measures such as securing premises and information, and following access-control procedures. When these measures are not adhered to, the likelihood of unauthorised access, theft, vandalism, or tampering with critical equipment increases. Such incidents could disrupt service delivery, and pose safety risks. Strengthening awareness, compliance, and monitoring is therefore essential to protect assets and ensure the service can operate without avoidable disruption.	Counter Terrorism Policing (North East) have undertaken a review of secu	Continuing Risk
CRR20	IF instability in the Middle East disrupts global fuel production or supply chains, THEN the service may face reduced availability of fuel, leading to potential impacts on appliance deployment, response times, and overall operational resilience.	Apr-26	Jul-26	2	3	6	2	3	6	No Change	The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has created instability in global fuel markets, increasing the likelihood of disruption to fuel availability and distribution. As a fuel-dependent emergency service, any interruption to supply could limit the ability of appliances, specialist vehicles, and support fleets to operate effectively. Reduced or inconsistent access to fuel would threaten the service's capacity to maintain response standards, sustain prolonged incidents, and deliver core operational functions.		Continuing Risk
CRR21	IF the transition of all emergency services from Airwave to ESN is not completed by 31st Dec 2029, THEN the national Airwave contract will need to be extended to cover the revised end date, and costs could increase to an as-yet undetermined level placing a funding pressure on the Brigade.	Jun-26	Jul-26	4	5	20	4	5	20	New Risk		This is a long-term risk which will not impact until financial year 2029-30. Risk to be monitored and reviewed as further information becomes available	New Risk